HISTORY IN THE LIBERAL ARTS: A THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE by Urban, C. Stanley
H I S T O R Y IN T H E LIBERAL, 
A R T S : A T H E O R Y O F 
K N O W L. E D G E 
C . S T A N L E Y U R B A N 
One cannot maximize teaching results from any discipline, say history, 
until a methodological appraisal has been made as to what one may reason-
ably expect of it as a body of knowledge. Neither may its proper place in 
the curriculum be determined without a consideration of what we may de-
mand of both art and science. Until clarification results, the position of 
history in the curriculum will continue to be ambiguous. 
The author assumes that painting is a typical art form and that physics 
is a typical science; our specific task is to compare painting, history, and 
physics as kinds of knowledge with reference to the following aspects: 1) 
purpose of the discipline 2) nature and significance of the aesthetic compo-
nent 3) kind of knowledge yielded and 4) characteristics of the communica-
tion system. 
One crucial question will be what, if anything, the artist may properly 
do in conceptualizing and creating a work of ar t which is denied the scien-
tist by the essential structure, purpose, and method of his discipline. Sup-
pose, for example, it is perceived that the painter is allowed certain l iber-
ties in communicating his ideas which are not admissible to the physicist. 
Then one ought to obtain a better understanding of the position of history v i s -
a-vis art and science by seeing whether these liberties are customarily ex-
tended to the historian, or denied to him, by the methodologist. 
Since the rebirth in the Renaissance of non-religious art, art ists have 
sought a justification for it; romantic painters in nineteenth century France 
offered the attractive ideology of art for ar t ' s sake. This theory insists that 
art , as the pursuit of the aesthetic experience through the creation of beauty 
of form and color, must be an end in itself, regardless of meaning and ex-
pression, and not merely a means to some other end. Whistler1 s celebrated 
painting of an Arrangement in Grey and Black affords an excellent example 
of a conflict between an artist who felt art should be independent of meaning 
and a public which insisted that art be related to experience. Whistler in-
tended to experiment with color combinations, being indifferent to subject 
matter, whereas the public valued the work only for its association with the 
idea of mother. Had he painted an old grey mare outside a village black-
smith shop, Whistler might have been equally satisfied with his artistry, but 
not so the sentimental public. * There is an obvious danger that the latter 
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may put a greater value on a mediocre painting of an object symbolizing 
love than a superb painting unattached to any such emotive symbol. To de-
clare that art has a terminal and not an instrumental value is not to endorse 
the extreme position that all art is useless. What is primary is the recog-
nition that an object of art need not be instrumental in order to qualify as 
an excellent work of art, and, furthermore, that s t ress on the instrumental 
character of ar t may be a potential threat to the existence of ar t itself. 
On the contrary, Western science is valued on pragmatic grounds, for 
it aspires to a secular control of the forces of nature. Of course, there are 
scholars like P. W. Bridgman who contends that the "pure" scientist is one 
who is impelled through sheer curiosity to understand phenomena without 
regard for their practical aspects. However, even he concedes that the 
greatest single gift of science to the public is the concept that the world is 
"understandable. " 2 Robert J. Oppenheimer is convincing when he argues 
that science "means a common power, a power to achieve that which could 
not be achieved without knowledge. M One of the most compelling reasons 
for supporting "pure" scientific research is the realization that without it 
technological advance, upon which we are all dependent, would grind to a 
halt. 3 Therefore, we value science not as an end in itself, but because it 
is necessary and useful in obtaining certain other desired outcomes. 
Unlike art , history's principal value lies in the message itself rather 
than in the mode of conveyance. The value of history lies in the fact that it 
supplies society a crucial element that it lacks, that of memory. Although 
history, as group memory of a meaningful past, is not as immediately avail-
able as personal memory, it is in some cases more reliable. All current 
social problems have their roots in history, and an intelligent approach to 
their solution demands a consideration of historical evolution. Knowledge 
of historical phenomena, says Morton White, affords "an additional perspec-
tive from which we view things; a perspective that yields important informa-
tion for purposes of prediction and control. " This is particularly true when 
historians give "dynamic generalizations" about recurring phenomena, say 
the tendency of the descendants of parvenus to become aristocratic. 4 Like 
empirical science, therefore, history has instrumental values. When meth-
odologists contemplate the discipline of history, they think of man's ability 
to learn from past experience. Time spent on the study of history is justi-
fied because it is a means to this end. 
One is almost immediately aware of the importance of the aesthetic com-
ponent when studying the philosophy of art . This occurs because the primary 
task of ar t i s "to treat the ineffable beauty . . . of the aesthetically imme-
diate. " Thus, anything apprehendable, say the blueness of Joan Miro's Las-
so, must be seen to be known. The richness of its color may not even be 
fully intuited by the observer over long periods of time, hi this sense the 
blueness is ineffable and hence mystical. 5 
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Apparently the aesthetic feeling cannot come if the work of art strikes 
so familiar a chord as to divert attention from the art object itself. The 
caveat against personal identification with the subject of a painting, say 
that of a doctor brooding at the bedside of a sick child, is a justification-of 
abstract art. This art affirms the principle: "Life as such is felt as the 
disturber of the aesthetic enjoyment. n 6 The aesthetic feeling comes only 
to those who, amid suitable conditions, have surrendered to the art object 
and are absorbed in it. 
Above all, there is no impulse to do anything practical when one expe-
riences the aesthetic feeling. The Indian Sa~hitya Darpana describes the im-
pulse in purely religious terms. "It is, " concludes Morris Weitz, fra kind 
of Platonic realm of emotional uni ver sais, the very contemplation of which 
is good for its own sake. "7 The aesthetician, as aesthetician, is indiffer-
ent to matters of sensed space and historical time. He does not care wheth-
er the particular object was wrought by hand in the Ming dynasty or machine 
tooled in Pittsburgh the day before. Neither does he care to pry into the 
state of mind of its maker. All of these questions introduce intellectual 
problems which demand answers before the object itself may be appreciated 
in an historical or sociological sense. They thus divert attention from the 
thing-in-itself which yields the aesthetic component. 8 
In physical science there appears a serious gap between problem solv-
ing, which is most valued, and the aesthetic component. When an artist 
contemplates a Grecian urn, he is concerned with the level of immediate 
perception, that is , line, form, color, etc. But, concludes F. £L C. North-
rop, for contemporary science the real "is not even such that it can be 
grasped by the imagination, to say nothing about it being sensed; only for-
mally by the intellect can it be known. "9 Regardless of its aesthetic prop-
erties, for example, the mechanistic theory fails to account for the myste-
rious deviation of the electron from its trajectory. Consequently, it is use-
less to sc ience. 1 0 Even if we grant the contention of Ashley Montagu that 
the aesthetic component permeates mathematical and laboratory situations, 
we are still confronted with the primacy of the scientific demand of function-
alism. Beauty without utility will solve no problems concerning the nature 
and behavior of physical reality. 
History deals with the past, or an essential part of time which is dis-
covered intellectually. Historical documents are the result of certain intel-
lectual concepts on the part of the recorder of the event. The historian's 
sensory impressions of an old document with peculiar markings on it are on 
the level of perception, but this experience has only limited interest. When 
the researcher makes the necessary transition from sensory impressions 
to the assumption that the document was the product of a specific personality 
in a designated space-time span, he has thereby passed to the field of scien-
tific constructs. Since the labors of an historian begin at this point, it is 
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evident he must adopt a problem-solving attitude which diverts attention 
from the possible aesthetic properties of the thing-in-itself. 
Since the original observer has already translated the event into an in-
tellectual concept, and the event itself is unobservable to the historian, he 
must deal with scientific postulates .1 2 Confronted with the testimony of 
the witness, the writer of the document, and unable to put searching ques-
tions to him directly, the historian must begin by asking himself whether 
the witness was able as well as willing to tell the truth. While an examina-
tion of the document itself is imperative in determining answers to these 
pertinent questions, the historical document is meaningless if apprehended 
in isolation. Likewise, historical fact is meaningless if unrelated to other 
facts and to deductive thought necessary to give meaning to congeries of 
facts. 
The kind of knowledge yielded by the arts generally concerns the inner 
man. Symbolism in art represents an effort to formulate a meaningful 
language whereby man can make public his private world, revealing his 
emotions, values, and insights into truth. Beyond this is the belief of ideal-
ists in art that this inner world is the real world. According to Benedetto 
Croce, in order to know reality, we may penetrate, by a process of sympa-
thy and intuition, "to the real nature of the object, thus discovering for the 
first time the strangeness and multiplicity of its qualities. " 1 3 Jacques 
Maritain quite properly calls this process the exact opposite from the ab-
straction of scientific truth. ^ This insistence that the artist can penetrate 
the plane of the commonplace event to discover the world of true reality has 
been voiced by many prominent Western contemporary art is ts . 
This artistic conviction of its knowledge of inner reality cannot be d is -
missed as symptomatic of a uniquely disordered period in art history be -
cause Oriental artists have traditionally maintained the same philosophy. 
When a Chinese artist singles out a bird or a flower, he tries to achieve 
self-identification with his subject "so that, being it, he can create it. "xo 
Japanese art is characterized by the leap of faith "that the essential truth 
could be better caught by an artist when he pierced through, or even neglect-
ed, externals. " 1 6 Historically this tendency is uppermost in Indian art. 
Even the figures in the erotic temple art are not meant to function biologi-
cally. One perceives mathematical relations rather than social interac-
tion. 1 7 
Science is content to waive ontological reality. It confines itself to an 
attempt to understand process, a dynamic and changing kind of physical r e -
ality. It can describe and classify things, explain their interrelationships, 
and formulate laws on the basis of their behavior. It can break things down 
into their component parts, but it will not attempt to say what either the 
thing or its elements "really are. " Neither is it concerned with problems 
of free will and ultimate rea l i ty . 1 8 
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Of course science deals not only with unseen elements but with unob-
servable ones; but, as in the case of the alpha article and the electron in 
the famous cloud chamber experiment of C. T. R. Wilson in 1911, these un-
observables are 'latently observable. " Henry Margenau explains similar 
phenemena. It is true, says he, that we cannot see the individual electrons, 
nor can we tell which one of the two holes the electron passed through. But 
if, on this account, we should deny the existence and the mass of an elec-
tron we should be ignoring a valuable aspect of our experience, namely 
"that there was after all an observable pattern on the screen. "-The primary 
problem for science is to reduce the system to order. ^ 
History can neither legitimately be used to explain the "real nature" of 
man, nor What it was "really like" to have been any individual in history. 
Historians, as well as methodologists, are aware of the difference between 
the brute event and written records by fallible observers. If it were possi-
ble for the historian to say what it was "really like" to have been Martin 
Luther at the Diet or Worms, it would mean that, beginning with admittedly 
imperfect documents, the researcher could not only somehow detail the 
event exactly as it happened, but probe the soul of Luther until that monk 
yielded all his secrets . As soon as one asks how this can be done, it is ob-
vious that the method is not acceptable by scientific canons. Sidney Hook 
concludes that what the researcher "offers as evidence of the historical sub-
ject 's state of mind does not differ in kind from the evidence that he offers 
for the physical behavior of the historical subject. " 2 0 
Accepting the postulate that, within recorded history, human nature has 
not changed,2 1 the job for the historian is to discover why the behavior of 
men and peoples have differed so widely in space and time. 2 2 In such a d is-
passionate study, the historians may assist other social scientists in the 
common goal of a science of man. 
Consequently, the historian of Luther at Worms appears as a behavior-
al scientist, for he describes, explains, and analyzes the way he spoke and 
acted there. Whatever the individual variations, the historian, fortified by 
a working hypothesis, attempts to discover the myriads of facts clustered 
around this single event, to select those deemed most pertinent, and to r e -
late them in a meaningful order. To be effective, the hypothesis must be 
impartially weighed against alternate hypotheses by some criterion or rough 
measuring device independent of it. This is the historian's equivalent for 
the controlled experiment. 2 3 
Despite growing communication difficulties between scientist and lay-
man, science is not to blame for this unfortunate condition. According to 
Albert Einstein, science seeks to set forth the fewest conceptual terms of 
clarity in order to explain coherently the orderly workings of nature. Eu -
clidian geometry and mathematics afford an excellent illustration of the de-
mand for simplicity. As long as classical physics could combine these and 
Newtonian concepts of physical reality to explain the behavior of macroscop-
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ic phenomena, the reasonably informed layman could comprehend science. 
But the system fell because of an inability to account for the stubborn de-
mands of empirical fact. Twentieth century atomic research revealed a 
world which was incomprehensible as long as one adhered to the concepts 
of classical physics. Quantum physics was formulated out of the basic ne-
cessity of science "to make the chaotic diversity of our sense-experience 
correspond to a logically uniform system of thought. " If the new physics 
is esoteric, this is because its theory must explain the unorthodox charac-
ter of the various particles inside the atom. Science, however, continues 
its search for a simple and unifying theoretical basis for all the sciences. 2 4 
Art is rooted in the ar t is t ' s imagination. It is in this sense that one 
properly speaks of the artist creating experience while the scientist seeks 
to understand it. The fact that art does deal in scientific truth and histori-
cal fact does not eliminate the distinction to be made between imaginative 
or intuitive truth, and scientific or demonstrated truth. Literature is not 
necessarily good literature because it borrows from both science and h is -
tory, and it may evoke beauty, truth, and goodness without an appeal to 
either. 2 5 
As a communication system, art involves the presentation by the artist 
of a new way of looking at a portion of the universe. It is successful when 
the observer understands its import, or its truth. 2 6 However, one may not 
demand that such communication be simple and direct. The ar ts may exalt 
mystical elements of human experience to the point that the mode of commu-
nication becomes mystical. 2 ? 
As long as the narrative form is used in historical writing, one cannot 
avoid literary elements of grammar, imagery, and style. Nevertheless, in 
conceptual and methodological aspects history, as a form of communication, 
is similar to empirical science. Instead of seeking to emote, history seeks 
to describe, classify, analyze, and understand. Proposition II of Bulle tin 
54 of the Social Science Research Council sanctions the historical drive to-
ward the unique. 2 ° History is secular, humanistic, and skeptical, reject-
ing arbitrary mystery. While imagination has an important role to play in 
attempting an approximation of past actuality, it must serve the greater 
claims of fact, truth, and clarity. 29 
Although history cannot be verified by means of measurement, the same 
difficulty belongs to the historical aspects of other empirical sciences. Franz 
Boas observes that, while there must have been a time when the mind of man 
was not superior to that of the higher apes of today, all extant men have much 
the same mentality. Obviously, scientists cannot "measure" the intelligence 
of some contemporary "man" who, while sub-human in mental capacity, is 
thought to be repeating the same evolutionary process as our remote ances-
tors underwent. 30 
History, however, is not deprived of the possibility of empirical verifi-
cation. One accepts Vilfredo Pareto 's hypothesis concerning the influence 
44 Journal CMVASA 
on prices of a sudden influx of money because of an opportunity to study the 
same data and arrive at the same conclusions. ^ His hypothesis also en-
ables prediction. 
Although both the artist and the historian are -confronted with the physi-
cal impossibility of reporting events in nature exactly as they happened, 
there are fundamental differences in the way each is permitted to report 
phenomena. One may reject Pablo Picasso's dictum: "Nature and art, be-
ing two different things, cannot be the same thing. Through art we express 
our conception of what nature is not. "32 But it is more difficult to deny the 
contention of Benedetto Croce who believes that, rather than the artist imi-
tating nature, what one has is a situation in which nature obeys the artistic 
imagination. 33 
Even when nature served as a model for art , and when artists were 
most affected by scientific aspirations, art ists consciously used the license 
to distort sensory impressions. Both Renaissance a r t 3 4 and that of the 
nineteenth century Impressionist school35 are replete with such examples 
which are at the same time independent of the difficulties of drawing three-
dimensional figures on a two-dimensional canvas. 
It is twentieth century art which, by virtue of its predominant tendency 
to abstraction, has established a great chasm between painting and history. 
The art one calls abstract, geometric, non-figurative, or expressionistic is 
characterized by the rejection of nature, or the common sense impressions 
yielded by such objects as the human anatomy, still life, and landscape. The 
chief values of abstract art are based upon an appreciation of line and color, 
and the realization that these two combine to produce an aesthetic value in 
form and design. 36 Primacy is given not to the outer reality of things, but 
to the art ist rs emotional reactions to experience. Such indifference to the 
ordinary sense world produces sharp artistic deviations in matters precious 
to the historian, that is , human personality, subject matter, sensed space, 
and historical time. Léger aptly sums up the victory of modern art: "In 
painting, the strongest restraint has been that of subject-matter upon com-
position. . . . The impressionist freed color—we have carried their attempt 
forward and freed form and design. Subject-matter being at last done for, 
we were free. "3? 
It is now apparent that history may be considered as an empirical sci-
ence because it shares with it these crucial characteristics: 
1) There is an assumption of an orderly world, independent of man's 
thought processes, which can be explained through natural cause and effect. 
2) It is uninterested in ontological reality, being preoccupied with phys-
ical and historical reality. 
3) Its attitude is skeptical and undogmatic. 
4) Excepting such postulates and attitudes, empirical science begins 
with sense data. As sense data, the historical document is less satisfactory 
than the flash of light for the physicist because it is a human being's idea of 
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the event itself. Yet, if we ask a physicist to explain Galileo's experiments 
with falling bodies, we perceive that his knowledge is historical knowledge. 
5) Theory is needed to organize and give meaning to sense experience, 
but all such constructs must square with that of experience. For history, 
the theory of elites must account for the shifting class structure within Rus-
sia in the present century. 
6) Empirical science may deal with unseen and unobservable elements, 
but they must be "latently observable. " The historian customarily deals 
with unobservables, say the battle of Gettysburg, but it is "latently observ-
able" in so far as there are documentary accounts, artifacts connected with 
it, and the existence of the battleground. And for a long time afterwards, 
there were survivors of the battle. All theory is tied to the level of per-
ception. 
7) Ideally, communication is as simple and direct as possible while at 
the same time adequately explaining the relation between event and theory, 
theory and event. 
8) Empirical science is valued in so far as it yields an orderly and co-
herent account of the sense world and enables man to come to terms with it. 
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